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We present a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation, taking
seriously the procedural and dialogical aspects of argumentation. The model applies proof
standards to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis. The model
uses different types of premises (ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions) and infor-
mation about the dialectical status of statements (stated, questioned, accepted or rejected)
to allow the burden of proof to be allocated to the proponent or the respondent, as appropri-
ate, for each premise separately. Our approach allows the burden of proof for a premise to
be assigned to a different party than the one who has the burden of proving the conclusion
of the argument, and also to change the burden of proof or applicable proof standard as the
dialogue progresses from stage to stage. Useful for modeling legal dialogues, the burden of
production and burden of persuasion can be handled separately, with a different responsible
party and applicable proof standard for each. Carneades enables critical questions of argu-
mentation schemes to be modeled as additional premises, using premise types to capture
the varying effect on the burden of proof of different kinds of questions.
Key words: Argument Structure, Argument Graphs, Argument Evaluation, Argumentation
Schemes, Burden of Proof, Proof Standards, Legal Argument
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1 Introduction
This article presents a functional model of the evaluation of commonsense argu-
ments, taking seriously the procedural and dialogical aspects of argumentation.
The model, called Carneades in honor of the Greek skeptic philosopher who em-
phasized the importance of plausible reasoning [9, vol. 1, p. 33–34], applies proof
standards [10] to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue ba-
sis. The model has been implemented using a functional programming language.
This system, also called Carneades, supports a range of argumentation tasks, in-
cluding argument reconstruction, evaluation and visualization.
Carneades is meant to overcome several limitations of current ‘mainstream’ AI
work on argumentation. The mainstream approach essentially regards the problem
of argument evaluation to be a question of defining the appropriate (nonmonotonic)
relation between sets of statements: a statement ‘follows’ from a set of statements if
an argument for it can be constructed that survives all attacks by counterarguments
that can be constructed from the same set of statements. (This idea can be refined in
various ways but that is not the issue here). This ‘relational’ approach ignores that
arguments are embedded in a procedural context, in that they can be seen as having
been put forward on one side or the other of an issue during a dialogue between
(human and/or artificial) agents. This dialogical context must be taken into account
when evaluating arguments. The information provided by a dialogue for construct-
ing and evaluating arguments is richer than just a set of sentences. The context can
tell us whether some party has questioned or conceded a statement, or whether a
decision has been taken, perhaps by a third party, to accept or reject a claim, tak-
ing into consideration the arguments which have been made. Such decisions may be
taken at intermediate states of the dialogue, for example when some alternatives are
eliminated after brainstorming during a deliberation. Moreover, the dialogue con-
text may provide information about the allocation of the burden of proof for each
statement. Legal applications may require the burden of production and burden of
persuasion to be handled separately, with a different responsible party and applica-
ble proof standard for each [35]. This allocation may well change over the course
of the dialogue. In the law of civil procedure, for example, the burden of proof
may be allocated to the party who has the better access to the evidence. Finally,
the proof standard may depend on the phase of the dialogue. For example, a weak
proof standard may be appropriate during the brainstorming phase of a deliberation
or during the pleading phase of a legal conflict.
The Carneades model has been designed to be applied in such rich dialogical con-
texts. The evaluation of arguments in Carneades depends on whether statements
have been questioned or decided; the allocation of the burden of proof; and the
proof standard applicable to questioned statements. All these elements depend on
the stage and context of the dialogue in which the arguments have been put forward.
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An influential classification of dialogue types is that of Walton and Krabbe [51].
For present purposes their distinction between persuasion and deliberation dialogue
is especially relevant. The goal of a deliberation dialogue is to solve a problem
while the goal of a persuasion dialogue is to test whether a claim is acceptable.
The present version of Carneades is meant to support persuasion dialogues. In such
dialogues, two or more participants try to resolve a difference of opinion by argu-
ing about the tenability of a claim, each trying to persuade the other participants
to adopt their point of view. Dialogue systems regulate such things as the precon-
ditions and effects of speech acts, including their effects on the commitments of
the participants, as well as criteria for terminating the dialogue and determining
its outcome. Good dialogue systems regulate all this in such a way that conflicting
viewpoints can be resolved in a way that is both fair and effective [24].
It is important to note that although Carneades has been designed to be embed-
ded in a procedural context, it does not itself define a dialogue protocol. No roles,
speech acts, termination criteria, or procedural rules are defined. Instead Carneades
is intended to be a reusable component providing services generally needed when
specifying such argumentation protocols.
In line with prior AI research, arguments in Carneades are defeasible, i.e, argu-
ments can be defeated by counterarguments. The Carneades model of defeasible
argument is founded on Walton’s theory of argumentation schemes [48]. Argumen-
tation schemes express reasoning policies, i.e. conventional patterns of reasoning,
and thus are dependent on the norms of the community. Arguments in Carneades
are designed to model instantiations of argumentation schemes. Besides being de-
feasible, argumentation schemes have a dialogical aspect in that they come with
a set of critical questions [20], which enumerate ways of challenging arguments
created using the scheme. Critical questions differ with regard to their impact on
the burden of proof [3,43]. For some critical questions, merely asking the question
is enough to shift the burden of proof back to the party who put forward the ar-
gument to answer the question. For other critical questions, the party who raised
the question also has the burden of answering it. Carneades models critical ques-
tions as additional premises of an argument, with a different type of premise, called
assumptions and exceptions, for each kind of question. 1
The Carneades model is the latest result of a research effort that started with the
Pleadings Game [14], a computational model of civil pleading in Anglo-American
Law. Besides a dialogue protocol, the Pleadings Game also included a component
for evaluating arguments in states of a dialogue. Like Carneades, the status of state-
1 In an earlier version of Carneades, as reported in [17], assumptions were called ‘pre-
sumptions’. This usage however conflicted with the meaning of ‘presumption’ in our main
intended application field, the legal domain. In the law, merely questioning a legal pre-
sumption is not enough to shift the burden of proof to the other party; the burden of proof
is on the party interested in rebutting the presumption. For example, the presumption of
innocence in criminal cases places the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt.
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ments in the dialogue state was taken into account by this evaluation. (Burden of
proof and proof standards were not modeled in the Pleadings Game.) Whereas
statements and arguments were modeled in the Pleadings Game using a specific
logical calculus, Geffner’s logic of Conditional Entailment [12], Carneades is de-
signed to be an open integration framework for various kinds of argumentation
schemes, using whatever kind of knowledge representation is appropriate for each
kind of scheme. Thus, like Dung’s abstract model of argument [8], Carneades does
not depend on a particular logical language for expressing statements, inference
rules or argumentation schemes.
Another ancestor of Carneades is Zeno [15], an argumentation model based on
Horst Rittel’s idea of an Issue-Based Information System (IBIS) [38]. In IBIS,
issues can be raised, ideas to resolve them can be proposed and arguments pro
and con the various ideas can be put forward. Zeno was intended to be simple
enough for use in web-based mediation systems and targeted to support practi-
cal decisions in deliberation dialogues, about what action to take. Later versions
of Zeno were used in several e-democracy pilot projects [16]. Like the present
work, Zeno included a model of proof standards and was intended as an integration
framework for arguments from “heterogeneous information sources and models”.
Whereas Zeno was designed for deliberation dialogues and based on the Rittel’s
IBIS model, Carneades has been designed primarily for persuasion dialogues and
is based on Walton’s philosophy of argumentation. It remains for future work to see
whether Carneades will also be suitable for deliberation dialogues. 2
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some features
of (natural) argumentation that motivate the design of Carneades, in particular ar-
gumentation schemes, dialogical attitudes towards statements, and the notion of
burden of proof. Section 3 defines the structure of argument graphs and illustrates
them with examples from related work by Toulmin and Pollock. Section 4 formally
defines the acceptability of statements in argument graphs in terms of proof stan-
dards, premise types, and the dialectical status of statements in dialogues. Section 5
returns to the subject of critical questions and illustrates how they can be modeled
using Carneades. Section 6 discusses how to model the distribution of the burdens
of production and persuasion using Carneades. Section 7 presents related work on
computational models of argument. Finally, we close in Section 8 with a recapitu-
lation of conclusions and ideas for future work.
2 Persuasion dialogues, like deliberation, can be about a course of action. The difference
between persuasion and deliberation is the starting point and goal of the dialogue, not its
subject matter. A persuasion dialogue begins with the making of a claim and has the goal
of persuading the opponent to accept this claim. Such claims can be about what course
of action would be best, or any other topic. Deliberation dialogues, on the other hand,
begin with a problem and have the goal of finding a solution to this problem. Typically,
the first phase of a deliberation has the goal of identifying stakeholders and their interests.
Only later, perhaps after brainstorming, are proposals for actions collected. When such a
proposal is defended, a deliberation dialogue can temporarily shift to a persuasion dialogue.
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2 Theoretical Background
In this section we look in some more detail at some features of natural argumenta-
tion that motivate the design of Carneades. In particular, we discuss argumentation
schemes, dialogical attitudes towards statements, and the notion of burden of proof.
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of reasoning used in everyday
conversational argumentation, and in other contexts as well, like legal and scientific
argumentation. They represent patterns of non-deductive reasoning that have long
been studied in argumentation theory. Historically, they are the descendants of the
so-called topics of Aristotle, thought to be useful for inventing arguments as well as
for evaluating them. In recent times, many schemes have been identified and studied
[11]. 3 Despite this body of work, little has been done in argumentation theory to
formalize the logical structure of the schemes. By contrast, artificial intelligence has
become increasingly interested in argumentation schemes, due to their potential for
making significant improvements in the reasoning capabilities of artificial agents
[37,43,3].
In argumentation theory, the device used for evaluating schemes [20] is that of a
specific set of critical questions matching each scheme. The questions represent at-
tacks, challenges or criticisms that, if not answered adequately, make the argument
fitting the scheme default. The critical questions evidently need to be formalized
along with the scheme, in order to capture the logic of each scheme as a defeasible
argument. The biggest problem is how to carry out this task, since the relationship
of a set of critical questions to a scheme brings in the notion of a dialogue sequence
between a questioner and an answerer. 4
Let us illustrate the concept of argumentation schemes with the scheme for argu-
ments from expert opinion, as formulated in [49, p. 210], with some minor nota-
tional changes:
Major Premise. Source E is an expert in the subject domain S containing
proposition A.
Minor Premise. E asserts that proposition A in domain S is true.
Conclusion. A may plausibly be taken as true.
The six basic critical questions matching the appeal to expert opinion [49, p. 223]
are the following.
3 We do not address in this article how argumentation schemes develop or evolve, or how
to design good argumentation schemes.
4 Dialogues do not require multiple agents. A single agent can be viewed as arguing with
himself, switching back and forth between pro and con viewpoints. The proponent and
opponent of a dialogue are roles, not agents. Any number of agents can occupy these roles.
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(1) How credible is E as an expert source?
(2) Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
(3) Does E’s testimony imply A?
(4) Is E reliable?
(5) Is A consistent with the testimony of other experts?
(6) Is A supported by evidence?
The method of evaluating an argument like one from expert opinion is by a shifting
of burden of proof in a dialogue [49]. When the respondent asks one of the six
critical questions a burden of proof shifts back to the proponent’s side, defeating or
undercutting the argument temporarily until the critical question has been answered
successfully. However, as will be suggested below, there are differences between
the critical questions on how strongly or weakly they produce such a shift.
The notion of a shift in the burden of proof from one side to another is a problem-
atic topic in the special kind of case in which an argument has been put forward
and a critical question matching the scheme for that argument has been asked. Does
merely asking the question make the argument default, or is the burden on the ques-
tioner to provide evidence? Providing a dialogue mechanism to handle a represen-
tation of how the burden of proof should shift in such an exchange goes beyond
what is currently available. Such observations have led to two theories about the
allocation of the burden of proof when critical questions are asked [50].
According to one theory, when the respondent asks a critical question, the burden
of proof automatically shifts back to the proponent’s side to provide an answer,
and if she fails to do so, the argument defaults (is defeated). On this theory, only
if the proponent provides an appropriate answer is the plausibility of the original
argument restored. This could be called the shifting burden theory, or SB theory.
According to the other theory, asking a critical question should not be enough to
make the original argument default. The question, if asked, needs to be backed up
with some evidence before it can shift any burden back to the proponent. This could
be called the backup evidence theory, or BE theory.
In AI it has recently been observed that argumentation schemes are related to defea-
sible inference rules in nonmonotonic logic. Bex et al. [3] argue that argumentation
schemes can be formalized as Pollock’s [29] defeasible reasons and that critical
questions that should be supported by backup evidence can be regarded as under-
cutters to such defeasible reasons. (Undercutters [29] providing reasons for break-
ing the connection between premises and conclusion of another reason in the given
circumstances. They can be used to express exceptions to defeasible reasons.) Ver-
heij [43] proposes a similar account, suggesting that it may be useful to handle dif-
ferent kinds of questions differently. He begins by showing that critical questions
can have four different kinds of roles.
(1) They can be used to question whether a premise of a scheme holds.
6
(2) They can point to exceptional situations in which a scheme should not be used.
(3) They can set conditions for the proper use of a scheme.
(4) They can point to other arguments that might be used to attack the scheme.
Verheij then applies these ideas within his Deflog logic [42]. Critical questions of
type (2) undercut an argument, those of type (3) refute specific implicit assumptions
on which the argument rests, while those of type (4) point to ‘rebutting’ counter-
arguments. (Rebuttals are in Pollock (1995) counterarguments with a conclusion
that is contradictory to that of its target.) Finally, Verheij [43] argues that critical
questions that address the premises of a scheme are redundant, because they merely
ask whether the premise is true.
Such accounts in terms of ordinary premises and exceptions of a defeasible infer-
ence rule provide a natural explanation as to why some critical questions shift the
burden of answering back to the proponent of the argument while other questions
must be backed up with evidence. However, they leave another issue unaddressed,
viz. the dialogical status of (ordinary) premises of an argumentation scheme. Ver-
heij’s claim that critical questions about the premises of a scheme are redundant
makes sense in a logical setting, with a static information state, in which the only
issue is whether a premise is given or derivable from what is given. In a dialogi-
cal setting, however, with a possibly changing information state, this is different.
Suppose, for example, that an argument instantiating the scheme from Expert Opin-
ion has been put forward and the other side has not yet said anything in response.
The question then is whether in the current dialogical context the conclusion of the
argument is acceptable. This boils down to the question whether silence implies
consent to the major and minor premise or not. Or to give a legal example, suppose
the plaintiff in a legal dispute claims that he and the defendant have a contract, ar-
guing that he made an offer accepted by the defendant and citing the legal rule that
an offer and acceptance constitute a contract. Although the argument is logically
perfectly acceptable, according to Dutch civil law, e.g., it is not sufficient, since
claims about offer and acceptance must be backed by evidence. Suppose the plain-
tiff provides such evidence, for example in the form of witness testimonies. If the
defendant continues not to reply, the plantiff’s argument will now be acceptable,
since the Dutch law of civil procedure states that factual claims not questioned by
the other party must be accepted by the court.
The upshot of all this is that in a dialogical context different kinds of premises must
be distinguished: those that must always be supported with further grounds; those
that can be assumed until they have been questioned; and those that do not hold in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. In this article we will call the first kind ‘or-
dinary premises’, the second kind ‘assumptions’ and third kind ‘exceptions’. Note
that assumptions are not the same as the negation of exceptions. 5 We claim that
5 Thus our use of the term ‘assumption’ deviates, e.g., from Bondarenko et al. [4], where
it is used for negations of what we call exceptions.
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‘static’, relational AI models of argumentation cannot handle the distinctions be-
tween these kinds of premises, since these distinctions only make sense in a proce-
dural context. Carneades, by contrast, has been designed for use in such procedural
contexts.
The final feature of argumentation motivating the design of Carneades concerns the
allocation of the burden of proof, especially in legal domain. The general intuitions
here are very much related to the distinction between the types of premises just dis-
cussed. When a party provides an argument instantiating some applicable scheme,
the burden is on that party to prove its ordinary premises and (once challenged)
its assumptions, after which the burden shifts to the other party to defeat the argu-
ment by rebutting it or pointing out exceptional circumstances. Legal systems make
fine-grained distinctions between different kinds of burdens of proof and we want
Carneades to account for these distinctions.
In civil law suits, the plaintiff generally has the burden of proof. This seems simple
enough, but the notion of burden of proof can refer to two different things [52,
p. 270], often called the risk of non-persuasion, or burden of persuasion, and the
burden of production: “The risk of non-persuasion operates when the case has come
into the hands of the jury, while the duty of producing evidence implies a liability
to a ruling by the judge disposing of the issue without leaving the question open
to the jury’s deliberations.” Wigmore wrote that the risk of non-persuasion never
shifts, but the duty of producing evidence to satisfy the judge does have this shifting
characteristic [52, pp. 285-286]. McCormick on Evidence [40, p. 425] defines the
burden of producing evidence in these terms: “The burden of producing evidence
on an issue means the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed
verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced.”. In contrast, the burden
of persuasion [40, p. 426] means that if the party having that burden has failed to
satisfy it, the issue is to be decided against that party. Park, Leonard and Goldberg
[26, p. 88] wrote that the burden of proof involves two things – the amount of
evidence required to establish the ultimate question of fact, and the allocation of
the risk of non-persuasion to that degree. The burden of persuasion, in their terms
[26, p. 89], defines the degree to which the fact-finder must be persuaded in order
for the ultimate claim to be proved, and which party must meet that burden. There
are various degrees, like “more likely than not”, “beyond reasonable doubt” and so
forth. This leads us in turn to the question of proof standards.
Both burdens can be distributed over the parties. For example, the plaintiff usually
has the burden of production for the ‘legal-operative’ facts of his main claim, while
the defendant has the burden of production for exceptions. The same can happen
with the burden of persuasion: while the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion for
his main claim, as observed by Prakken and Sartor [35] the burden of persuasion
for other statements can de distributed over the parties. In the case of exceptions,
sometimes only the burden of production rests on the defendant; once this burden
is satisfied, the plaintiff has the burden of persuading the court that the exception
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does not hold. This is the case, for instance, with all exceptions in criminal law.
Carneades, we claim, is able to handle these different ways of distributing the bur-
dens of production and persuasion.
We now see that, when discussing above how critical questions affect the burden of
proof, we meant the burden of production in particular. In formal accounts, distri-
butions of the burden of production can be simply expressed by formulating excep-
tions. However, as shown by Prakken [30], distributions of the burden of persuasion
cannot be expressed by current ‘mainstream’ AI formalisms for argumentation. In
particular, they cannot express the distinction between cases where the exception
has to be proven (i.e., a decision maker has to be convinced that the exception is
true) and cases where the exception merely has to be made plausible (i.e., a deci-
sion maker would have reason to doubt it is not true). Current nonmonotonic logics
can only model the latter kind of situation. Accordingly, the system of Prakken and
Sartor [34], based on Dung’s grounded semantics, was adjusted in [30] to cope with
this.
The approach taken in Carneades to the problem of determining how the burden of
proof should be distributed is as follows. The burden of production is distributed
by dividing premises into different types: evidence for ordinary premises and (once
challenged) assumptions must be produced by the proponent of the argument with
these premises, while evidence for exceptions must be produced by the respondent.
In addition some initially low proof standard needs to be assigned to the statement
of each premise. After the burden of production has been met, the burden of per-
suasion can be distributed by raising the proof standard assigned to the statement.
Changing the proof standard can also cause the burden to shift from one party to
another.
Summarizing, Carneades allows the burdens of production and persuasion to be
allocated, separately, to either the proponent or the respondent and modified during
the course of the dialogue. The initial allocation of the burden of production is
regulated by the premise types of the argumentation scheme applied. The burden of
persuasion is allocated by assigning the appropriate proof standard. As the dialogue
progresses, subject to the argumentation protocol, the burdens may be reallocated
by changing the assignment of premise types and proof standards via speech acts
designed for this purpose.
3 Argument Graphs
We begin by defining the structure of argument graphs. Our conception of argu-
ment graphs is similar to Pollock’s concept of an inference graph [29], in that there
are nodes in the graph representing statements (propositions) and links which in-
dicate inference relations between statements. Unlike Dung’s model [8], in which
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the internal structure of arguments is irrelevant, our model of the acceptability of
statements makes use of and depends on the usual conception of argument in the ar-
gumentation theory literature, where arguments are instantiations of argumentation
schemes linking a set of premises to a conclusion. The premises and the conclusion
of arguments are statements about the world, whether empirical or institutional,
which may be accepted or rejected. For the purpose of evaluating arguments, the
syntax of statements is not important. We only require the ability to determine
whether two statements are syntactically equal and some way to denote the logical
complement of a statement.
Definition 1 (Statements) Let 〈statement,=, complement〉 be a structure, where
statement denotes the set of declarative sentences in some language,= is an equal-
ity relation, modeled as a function of type statement× statement → boolean, and
complement is a function of type statement → statement mapping a statement to
its logical complement. If s is a statement, the complement of s is denoted s.
Next, to support defeasible argumentation and allow the burden of proof to be dis-
tributed, we distinguish several types of premises.
Definition 2 (Premises) Let premise denote the set of premises. There are the fol-
lowing types of premises:
(1) If s is a statement, then s, called an ordinary premise, is a premise.
(2) If s is a statement, then •s, called an assumption, is a premise.
(3) If s is a statement, then ◦s, called an exception, is a premise.
(4) Nothing else is a premise.
Now we are ready to define the structure of arguments.
Definition 3 (Arguments) An argument is a tuple 〈c, d, p〉, where c is a statement,
d ∈ {pro, con} and p ∈ 2premise. If a is an argument 〈c, d, p〉, then conclusion(a) =
c, direction(a) = d and premises(a) = p.
Note that an argument may have an empty set of premises. One difference between
arguments and inference rules is evident in the distinction between pro and con ar-
guments. Semantically, con arguments are instances of presumptive inference rules
for the negation of the conclusion; if the premises of a con argument hold, this
provides reasons to reject the conclusion or, equivalently, to accept its logical com-
plement. Our approach abstracts completely from the syntax of the language for
statements. Also, the use of both pro and con arguments is in accordance with our
view of argumentation as a dialectical process. The arguments pro and con some
statement need to be ordered or otherwise aggregated to resolve the conflict.
We assume arguments are put forward by the participants of a dialogue, where
a dialogue is a sequence of speech acts such as asserting claims, conceding or
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questioning claims and making arguments. Speech acts can be modeled as functions
which map a state of the dialogue to another state. Argument graphs, defined next,
have been designed to be a part of these dialogue states, as a structure for keeping
track of the arguments which have been made and their relations.
An argument graph is a kind of proof tree in that it provides a basis for explana-
tions and justifications. The acceptability relation between argument graphs and
statements is intended to model the sufficiency of the proof: intuitively, a statement
is acceptable given the arguments if and only if the argument graph is a proof of
the statement. This distinguishes the acceptability relation from the defeasible con-
sequence relation of nonmonotonic logics. In a calculus for such logics, assuming
it is correct and complete, a statement is a defeasible consequence of a set of state-
ments if and only if the statement is derivable in the calculus, whether or not such
a proof has in fact been derived.
Argument graphs have two kinds of nodes, statement nodes and argument nodes.
The edges of the graph link up the premises and conclusions of the arguments. 6
In Carneades argument graphs, at most one statement node is allowed for every
statement s and its complement, s. A statement and its complement are not just two
unrelated statements. A dispute about s is also a dispute about s. An argument pro
one is an argument con the other. If one of these statements is accepted, the other
must be rejected. There are no restrictions on the use of statements in premises.
Both s and s may be used in premises, no matter which statement is represented
by a statement node in the argument graph. Restricting statement nodes to at most
one node for each s and s pair avoids the duplication of all arguments pro s as
arguments con s and helps to reduce the complexity of diagrams of the graphs. If s
is represented by a statement node in an argumentation graph, then a premise using
s is called a negative premise. Ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions may
all be negative, using s, •s, and ◦s.
In the diagrams of argument graphs which follow, statements are displayed as boxes
and arguments as circles or rounded boxes. Different arrowhead shapes are used
to distinguish pro and con arguments as well as the different kinds of premises.
Pro arguments are indicated using ordinary arrowheads; con arguments with open
arrowheads. Ordinary premises are represented as edges with no arrowheads, as-
sumptions with closed-dot arrowheads and exceptions with open-dot arrowheads.
Negative premises have an additional tee mark (a short perpendicular line). No-
6 Notice that argument graphs in Carneades are different than the dialectical graphs of
the first author’s Pleadings Game [13,15]. These dialectical graphs had only one kind of
node, for arguments represented as sets of statements, and their edges modeled support,
defeat and rebuttal relations between arguments. Argument graphs in Carneades have a bit
more in common with the dialectical graphs of the same author’s Zeno system [15], whose
position nodes are like statement nodes, but arguments in Zeno are modeled as a binary
relation between two positions and thus do not support arguments with multiple premises,
let alone different types of premises.
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tice that the premise type cannot be adequately represented using statement labels:
since argument graphs are not restricted to trees, a statement may be used in several
premises with different types.
Figure 1 illustrates this method of diagramming argument graphs with a toy legal
argument. The issue is whether there is a contract. One con argument, a2, states
there is not a contract because the agreement is not in writing although it is for the
sale of real estate. The other con argument, a3, states the agreement is not in writing
since is was by email. Argument a1 states there is a contract, because agreements
are contracts unless one of the parties is a minor. Argument a5 states the agreement
is for the sale of real estate, assuming there is a deed, i.e. a written instrument
conveying the property. Argument a4 uses the deed as evidence of there having
been an agreement. These last two arguments, especially, may not be realistic, but
were contrived only to illustrate how argument graphs are not restricted to trees and
how a statement can be used in different types of premises in several arguments.
a1









The agreement is for
 the sale of real estate.
One of the parties
 is a minor.
The agreement
 was by email. There is a deed.
Fig. 1. Argument Graph
Although argument graphs are not restricted to trees, they are not completely gen-
eral; we do not allow cycles. This restriction is intended to assure the decidability
of the acceptability property of statements. At first sight, the condition that argu-
ment graphs be acyclic would seem to be a severe limitation. However, things are
not that serious. Firstly, in systems using Dung’s approach most cycles in realis-
tic examples are two-cycles between arguments with incompatible conclusions. In
Carneades, these can be represented as a pair of arguments pro and con the same
statement, which does not introduce cycles into the argument graph. Next, cycles
caused by indirectly using a statement in support of itself are also excluded in many
other systems. This leaves cycles through exceptions, as shown in Figure 2.
Such examples have always been somewhat problematic in nonmonotonic logic.
For instance, in Dung’s [8] abstract framework defeat graphs with odd cycles may






Fig. 2. Exception Cycle
[1]. Prior ‘relational’ approaches to this problem, such as Dung’s preferred and
grounded semantics as alternatives for stable semantics, are not directly transferable
to Carneades, with its dialogical and procedural elements. We therefore leave an
extension to graphs that allow for cycles through exceptions for future work.
Definition 4 (Argument Graphs) An argument-graph is a labeled, finite, directed,
acyclic, bipartite graph, consisting of argument nodes and statement nodes. The
edges link the argument nodes to the statements in the premises and conclusion of
each argument. At most one statement node is allowed for each statement s and its
complement, s.
This completes the formal definition of the structure of arguments and argument
graphs. Let us now discuss briefly the expressiveness of this model, beginning
by comparing our approach with Toulmin’s argumentation scheme [41]. Toulmin’s
scheme can be instantiated to produce arguments in Carneades with four premises:
a minor premise called the datum; a defeasible major premise called the warrant, an
additional piece of data supporting the warrant, called backing, and an exception,
somewhat confusingly called a rebuttal. Toulmin’s model also contains a qualifier
stating the probative value of the inference (e.g. presumably, or necessarily). The
strength of arguments is modeled by a partial order in Carneades, as explained in
Section 4 .
To illustrate, Figure 3 reconstructs Toulmin’s standard example about British cit-
izenship in Carneades. Notice that the ‘rebuttal’ is modeled as an exception and
the backing as an assumption. Both the datum and warrant are ordinary premises.
Alternatively, backing could be modeled as the premise of an additional argument
pro the warrant, by generalizing the concept of an argumentation scheme to cover
patterns with multiple arguments.
In this diagram, the premise links have been labeled with the role each premise
plays in Toulmin’s scheme. This also illustrates the distinction between premise
types in Carneades and the roles of premises in argumentation schemes. These are
orthogonal properties of premises.
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Harry is a British subject.
a1 : Toulmin
Harry was born in 
Bermuda. 
A man born in Bermuda 
will generally be a British 
subject. 
Civil Code §123 Harry has become an American citizen.
datum warrant backing "rebuttal"
Fig. 3. Reconstruction of Toulmin Diagrams
Our model of argument is rich enough to handle Pollock’s rebuttals and undercut-
ting defeaters [29] as well as premise defeat. Rebuttals can be modeled as argu-
ments in the opposite direction for the same conclusion. 7 (If an argument a1 is
pro some statement s, then some argument a2 con s is a rebuttal of a1, and vice
versa.) Premises can be defeated by further arguments pro or con the statement of
the premise, depending on the type of premise.
As for undercutting defeaters, according to Pollock these are exceptions to defeasi-
ble ‘reasons’. Accordingly, undercutters can be modeled directly using Carneades
exceptions. Consider Pollock’s example of something looking red being a reason
for believing it is red, unless it turns out to be illuminated by a red light. Figure 4
shows a reconstruction in Carneades of this argument.
a1
The object is red.
The object looks red. The object is illuminatedby a red light.
Fig. 4. Undercutting Defeater Example
Exceptions to defeasible generalizations, such as legal rules, can be understood
as critical questions of argumentation schemes developed for reasoning with these
generalizations. Consider, for example, a legal rule prohibiting vehicles in parks
[19]. An argumentation scheme for reasoning with legal rules might include crit-
ical questions for challenging the validity of the rule or asking whether the rule
is excluded by some other rule with higher priority in a particular case [44]. For
example, one could use the second critical question to undercut an argument for
some ambulance not being allowed in a park, by citing another rule excluding am-
bulances on duty. Such critical questions can also be modeled using exceptions in
7 One must be careful not to confuse Pollock’s rebuttals with Toulmin’s, which would be
represented as undercutters in Pollock’s model.
14
Carneades.
Two kinds of arguments, convergent and linked, are distinguished in the litera-
ture [47]. Convergent arguments provide multiple reasons for a conclusion, each of
which alone can be sufficient to accept the conclusion. Convergent arguments are
handled in our approach by multiple arguments for the same conclusion. Linked
arguments, on the other hand, consist of two or more premises which all must hold
for the argument to provide significant support for its conclusion. They are handled
in our approach by defining arguments to consist of a set of premises, rather than a
single premise, and defining arguments to be defensible only if all of their premises
hold. (The concept of argument defensibility is defined below.)
Assumptions and exceptions can be used to model Walton’s concept of critical
questions [48]. Critical questions enumerate specific ways to defeat arguments
matching some argumentation scheme. But so long as an issue has not been raised
by actually asking some critical question, we would like to be able to express which
answer to assume. The distinction between assumptions and exceptions here pro-
vides this ability. Section 5 illustrates one way to reconstruct the scheme for argu-
ments from expert opinion using Carneades.
4 Argument Evaluation
By argument evaluation we mean determining whether a statement is acceptable in
an argument graph. 8 Intuitively, a statement is acceptable if a decision to accept
the statement as true can be justified or explained given the arguments which have
been put forward in the dialogue. The definition of the acceptability of statements is
recursive. The acceptability of a statement depends on its proof standard. Whether
or not a statement’s proof standard is satisfied depends on the defensibility of the
arguments pro and con this statement. The defensibility of an argument depends
on whether or not its premises hold. Finally, we end up where we began: whether
or not a premise holds can depend on whether or not the premise’s statement is
acceptable. Since the definitions are recursive, we cannot avoid making forward
references to functions which will be defined later.
To evaluate a set of arguments in an argument graph, we require some additional
information. Firstly, we need to know the current dialectical status of each state-
ment in the dialogue, i.e. whether it is stated, questioned, accepted, or rejected.
This status information is pragmatic; the status of statements is set by speech acts
in the dialogue, such as asking a question, putting forward an argument or making
8 In argumentation theory, argument evaluation has a somewhat broader meaning, includ-
ing such tasks as matching arguments to argumentation schemes and revealing missing
premises.
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a decision. Secondly, we assume that a proof standard has been assigned to each
statement. In the following, let proof-standard be an enumeration of some proof
standards. Finally, we assume a strict partial ordering on arguments, which we will
denote with >. Let a1 and a2 be arguments. If a1 > a2 we say that a1 has priority
over a2. Let us formalize these requirements by postulating an argument context as
follows.
Definition 5 (Argument Context) Let C, the argument context, be a tu-
ple 〈status, ps, >〉, where status is a function of type statement →
{stated, questioned, accepted, rejected}, ps is a function of type statement →
proof-standard and > is a strict partial ordering on arguments. 9 For every state-
ment s and its complement s, the proof standard assigned to s is the complement of
the proof standard assigned to s and
• if status(s) = stated then status(s) = stated,
• if status(s) = questioned then status(s) = questioned,
• if status(s) = accepted then status(s) = rejected, and
• if status(s) = rejected then status(s) = accepted.
The constraints on the status of statements in this definition serve two purposes:
First, they assure that whenever a statement is stated or questioned its complement
is also, implicitly, stated or questioned. Stating or questioning a statement does
imply the assertion of some position or viewpoint pro or con the statement. Stating
a statement merely introduces it into the dialogue. Questioning a statement merely
makes an issue out of the statement. Second, the constraints assure that whenever
a statement is accepted its complement is rejected and vice versa. A decision to
accept one is simultaneously a decision to reject the alternative.
In the definitions which follow, an argument context is presumed.
Definition 6 (Acceptability of Statements) Let acceptable be a function of type
statement× argument-graph → boolean. A statement s is acceptable in an argu-
ment graph G if and only if it satisfies its proof standard:
acceptable(s,G) = satisfies(s, ps(s), G).
Definition 7 (Satisfaction of Proof Standards) A proof standard is a function of
type statement× argument-graph → boolean. A statement s is satisfied by a
proof standard f in an argument graph G if and only if f(s,G) is true.
The following proof standards are defined in this article. We do not claim these
particular proof standards are exhaustive. Others can be defined similarly.
9 Should the need arise to make the proof standard of a statement depend on the argument
in which the statement is used as a premise, the ps function of the context could be extended
to be of type statement× argument → proof-standard.
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SE (Scintilla of Evidence). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by
at least one defensible pro argument.
BA (Best Argument). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by some
defensible pro argument with priority over all defensible con arguments.
DV (Dialectical Validity). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by at
least one defensible pro argument and none of its con arguments are defensible.
In addition, a proof standard can be derived from another by switching the roles of
pro and con arguments in the standard:
Definition 8 (Complement of a Proof Standard) The complement of a proof stan-
dard σ, denoted σ, is the standard which results by switching the roles of pro and
con arguments in the definition of σ.
For example, the complement of the BA proof standard, BA, is satisfied iff the
statement is supported by some defensible con argument with priority over its
strongest defensible pro argument. In principal a statement can satisfy both a proof
standard and its complement, highlighting the difference between acceptability and
truth. The arguments can be sufficient to justify a decision either way without being
inconsistent. In practice, however, this will be the case only with very weak proof
standards, such as scintilla of evidence. If there exists a defensible pro argument
and a defensible con argument, then both SE and its complement, SE, are satisfied.
Further research is required to define and validate models of proof standards for
various applications. In particular we do not claim that any of the standards defined
here adequately model legal proof standards.
The standards defined here can be ordered by their relative strength:
DV > BA > SE
If a statement satisfies a proof standard, it will also satisfy the weaker proof stan-
dards. The best argument (BA) standard uses a strict partial ordering on arguments
to resolve conflicts. Recall that we assume such an ordering as part of the argument
context.
All of the proof standards defined above depend on a determination of the defensi-
blity of arguments. Defensibility is defined next.
Definition 9 (Defensibility of Arguments) Let defensible be a function of type
argument× argument-graph → boolean. An argument α is defensible in an ar-
gument graph G if and only if all of its premises hold in the argument graph:
defensible(α,G) = all(λp. holds(p,G))(premisesα). 10
10 Here ‘all’ is a higher-order function, not a quantifier, applied to an anonymous function,
represented with λ, as in lambda calculus.
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Now we come to the last definition required for evaluating arguments, of the holds
predicate. This is where the dialectical status of a statement and the type of premises
come into play.
Definition 10 (Holding of Premises) Let holds be a function of type
premise× argument-graph → boolean. Whether or not a premise holds
depends on its type. Thus, there are the following cases:
If p is an ordinary premise, s, then
holds(p,G) =

acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = stated
acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
true if status(s) = accepted
false if status(s) = rejected
If p is an assumption, •s, then
holds(p,G) =

true if status(s) = stated
acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
true if status(s) = accepted
false if status(s) = rejected
Finally, if p is an exception, ◦s, then
holds(p,G) =

¬acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = stated
¬acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
false if status(s) = accepted
true if status(s) = rejected
It can be proven that there is always a unique and complete assignment of ‘accept-
able’ or ‘not acceptable’ to statements, and of ‘holds’ or ‘not holds’ to premises.
Theorem 1 For every argument context C with proof standards SE, BA orDV and
every argument graph G: acceptable and holds are total functions.
Moreover, if the BA or DV proof standard is assigned to a statement in the context,
it can never be the case that both the statement and its complement are acceptable.
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Theorem 2 For every argument context C with proof standards BA or DV and ev-
ery argument graph G, no statement s exists such that s and s are both acceptable.
The proofs are in the appendix. The important thing to notice is that whether or
not a premise holds depends in this model not only on the arguments which have
been put forward, but also on the type of premise and the status of the premise’s
statement in the context. We assume that the status of a statement progresses in the
course of the dialogue:
(1) Statements are introduced, i.e. ‘stated’, by using them in arguments. Whether
or not a premise which uses this statement holds at this stage of the dialogue
depends on the kind of premise. Ordinary premises hold only if the statement
is acceptable given whatever arguments have been put forward; assumptions
hold unconditionally. 11 This is the only difference between ordinary premises
and assumptions in the model. Exceptions holds at this stage only if the state-
ment is not acceptable given the arguments put forward.
(2) At some point a participant may explicitly make an issue out of a statement,
by questioning it. Now both ordinary premises and assumptions which use
this statement hold only if they are acceptable. Exceptions continue to hold
only if the statement is not acceptable. We assume that arguments will be
exchanged in a dialogue for some period of time, and that during this phase
the acceptability of statements will be in flux.
(3) Finally, at some point a decision will be made to either accept or reject some
statement. Accepting a statement implicitly rejects its complement and vice
versa. The model constrains the decisions which can be justified or explained.
Any interested person can check whether the decisions are justified given the
arguments made and the applicable proof standards. After a decision has been
made, it is respected by the model. For example, ordinary premises with ac-
cepted statements hold and ordinary premises with rejected statements do not
hold.
5 Modeling Critical Questions in Carneades
When the scheme for arguments from expert opinion is instantiated to create a spe-
cific argument, the critical questions can be represented in Carneades as assump-
tions and exceptions. Whether an assumption or exception is appropriate depends
on who should have the burden of production, which is a policy issue dependent on
the domain. If the respondent, the person who poses the critical question, should
have the burden of production, then the critical question should be modeled as an
exception. If, on the other hand, the proponent, the party who used the scheme
11 Both a statement and its complement may be assumed at the same time, but only in the
context of premises of different arguments.
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to construct the argument, should have the burden of production, then the critical
question should be modeled as an assumption.
The distinction between assumptions and exceptions in Carneades allows answers
to be assumed for critical questions which have yet to be asked. Which type of
premise is appropriate depends on the policy of the argumentation scheme. If a new
argumentation scheme is being modeled, the premise type can be used to clearly ex-
press the desired policy. Modeling an existing argumentation scheme requires the
scheme to be interpreted to determine the policy intended by its drafters, similar
to the way legislation must be interpreted. In our interpretation of the scheme for
arguments from expert opinion, the shifting burden theory seems appropriate for
the expertise and backup evidence questions, since experts are generally credible
sources of knowledge in their field, who typically base their testimony on evidence.
Thus these questions have been modeled as assumptions. But the backing evidence
theory seems more appropriate for the trustworthiness and consistency questions,
since it is easier to produce evidence of instances of unreliable or inconsistent be-
havior than to try to prove that no instances of such behavior have occurred. Ap-
plying the general principal of allocating the burden of production to the party with
better access to the evidence, we have modeled these questions as exceptions.
The scheme for argument from expert opinion can be recast to fit the Carneades
model as follows, where ‘premise’ here means ordinary premise:
Premise. E is an expert in the subject domain S containing the proposition A.
Premise. E asserts A.
Assumption. E is a credible expert.
Exception. E is not reliable.
Exception. A is not consistent with the testimony of other experts.
Assumption. A is based on evidence.
Conclusion. A.
6 Modeling Distributions of Proof Burdens in Carneades
In this section we illustrate how premise types and proof standards in Carneades
can be used to allocate various burdens of proof, and the importance of being able
to do so, reusing Prakken and Sartor’s example about a murder trial [35].
According to Section §187 of the California Penal Code, murder is (unlawful)
killing with ‘malice aforethought’. Section §197 states an exception for self-defense.
Let’s suppose the criminal proceedings have been initiated by the prosecution filing
a complaint in which it makes its first arguments, by applying a scheme for argu-
ments from legal rules to Section §187 and providing enough evidence of killing
and malice aforethought to meet the burden of production required to bring the case
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to trial. Let us assume the defense has accepted the killing and malice elements of
the crime, so these are not at issue. Using a simplified scheme for arguments from
legal rules derived from Reason-Based Logic [44], the argument can be modeled in





§187 excluded. §187 is valid.
Fig. 5. The Murder Complaint
Figure 5 illustrates how premise types are assigned by applying argumentation
schemes. The appropriate type of premise is a policy issue which must be addressed
when developing argumentation schemes and legal rules. In the scheme for argu-
ments from legal rules used here, the validity of a legal rule is assumed, and thus
must be supported with evidence only if questioned; being excluded by some other
rule is an exception, and the elements of the crime, killing and malice here, are
ordinary premises which must always be supported with evidence. In the example
we assume sufficient evidence, not shown, was provided to justify the acceptance
of the killing and malice ordinary premises.
This figure, as well as the others in this section, were generated and labeled by the
implementation of Carneades. The statements shown in gray have been accepted
(killing, malice) or are acceptable (murder). In the initial context, all statements are
assigned the lowest proof standard, scintilla of the evidence (SE), and no argument
has priority over any other. The murder charge is acceptable in this initial context,
given the argument and the claims accepted by the defense. The prosecution has
met its burden of production.
Next, the defense puts forward its self-defense argument, citing Section §197 of
the Penal Code, and calls a witness who testifies that the defendant was attacked
with a knife by the victim. After these moves, the argument graph is as shown in
Figure 6. The argument concluding that Section §187 is excluded, a2, is another
instance of the scheme for arguments from legal rules. The third argument applies
a simplified scheme for arguments from testimony. Since the witness testified be-
fore the court, we assume the fact this testimony was made is accepted. (This does
not imply accepting that the defendant was attacked.) This is enough to meet the
defense’s burden of production for the self-defense claim, again applying the SE
proof standard. Thus, as can be seen in the Figure 6, the counterargument succeeds
in making the murder charge no longer acceptable.











§187 excluded. §187 is valid.
§197 is excluded. §197 is valid.
Fig. 6. The Argument Graph after W1’s Testimony
would be to question the credibility of the witness, which is a critical question of
the scheme for arguments from testimony, modeled here as an exception. The pros-
ecution in our example, however, chooses another move, by calling another witness
to the stand to testify that the defendant had enough time to run away. The state of
the argument graph after this move is shown in Figure 7. This second application
of the scheme for arguments from testimony also illustrates how rebuttals are mod-
eled as con arguments in Carneades. Notice, however, that this rebuttal does not
(yet) succeed. The self-defense claim is still acceptable. This is because the pros-
ecution has the burden of persuasion in criminal cases, also for exceptions such
as the self-defense claim here. After the defendant met his burden of production
for self-defense, the proof standard of the self-defense statement was changed in
the model to a standard which reflects the prosecution’s burden of persuasion. This
proof standard is satisfied if it is not the case that the complement of the best ar-
gument (BA) standard is satisfied. Recall that the complement of the BA standard
is satisfied only if the best con argument has priority over the best pro argument.
But since the arguments have not been ordered, this is not yet the case. Thus the
self-defense claim is still acceptable.
The source of the priority ordering on arguments depends on the application sce-
nario. In a criminal proceeding, determining the relative strength of evidence, such
as witness testimony, is a task for the jury. How best to model the ‘beyond a rea-
sonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal proceedings is a question for future
research. One approach, suggested by Prakken and Sartor [35], is to apply the BA





W1 testified 'attack'. W2 is not credible.
a4
Witness W2 testified







§187 excluded. §187 is valid.
§197 is excluded. §197 is valid.
Fig. 7. The Argument Graph After W2’s Testimony
The burden of proof, whether it be the burden of production or persuasion, is as-
signed to some party in the dialogue, either the proponent or respondent. These
roles are relative to some statement, such as a claim or thesis. One party may be the
proponent with regard to one statement and the respondent with respect to another.
The example illustrates how this is modeled in Carneades. Whereas the prosecu-
tion is the proponent of the main claim, i.e. the murder charge, the defense is the
proponent of the legal claim that Section §187 is excluded by the self-defense rule
of Section §197. The defense is also the proponent of the factual claim that the
defendant did, in fact, act in self defense. However, due to the prosecution’s burden
of persuasion in criminal cases, it has the burden of persuading the jury that that
defendant did not, in fact, act in self defense, even though it has the respondent role
and the defense had the burden of production, with respect to the self-defense issue.
Had this been a civil case, the defense would have had the burden of persuasion for
the self-defense issue and the proof standard for the burden of persuasion would
have been the lower ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard. To appreciate what
a difference this can make, consider the O.J. Simpson case, where he was found not
guilty of murder in the criminal proceeding but lost the later civil case against him
about the same killing. Given the arguments shown in Figure 7, assuming the ar-
guments pro and con self-defense have equal priority in the context, ‘self-defence’
would be acceptable in a criminal case but not in a civil case. This illustrates how
burden of proof assignments depend on the procedural context.
In addition to selecting the appropriate premise type when developing argumenta-
tion schemes, to handle burden of proof one must also design the argumentation
protocol, at the procedural level, so that the appropriate proof standard is assigned
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to statements at each stage of the proceedings. One way to do this, as we have
done in this example, is select some standard to apply by default to all statements,
and then assign some other standard to particular statements as speech acts are
performed, as required by the protocol.
The burden of persuasion typically requires a more stringent proof standard to be
satisfied than the burden of production. Moreover, the party who has the burden of
persuasion need not be the same as the party who had the burden of production. If
the same party has both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, then
all that is required is to change the proof standard to one requiring the arguments
pro the statement to be stronger than the arguments con the statement, where the
proof standard defines just how much stronger the pro arguments must be. Given
the example proof standards defined in this article, any proof standard except SE
would be suitable.
As illustrated in the example, however, modeling the situation where the party who
has the burden of persuasion is not the same as the party who had the burden of
production is a more subtle problem, which can require some thought when chang-
ing the proof standard after the burden of production has been met. In the example,
the appropriate standard was the negation of the complement of the best argument
standard.
7 Related Work
The idea of developing a computer model for managing support and justification
relationships between propositions goes back to research on truth and reason main-
tenance systems in Artificial Intelligence, beginning with Jon Doyle’s Truth Main-
tenance System [7]. Probably the most famous system of this kind is Johan de
Kleer’s Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance System [6]. The system presented
here is more like Doyle’s original system; the way it supports defeasible reasoning
using arguments with different kinds of premises is reminiscent of Doyle’s use of
in and out lists in justifications.
The idea of using different kinds of premises to help structure dialogues was also
made by [2], which applied Toulmin’s argumentation scheme [41] to annotate the
conditions in the body of Horn clauses with their role in the scheme (data, warrant,
backing, rebuttal) and used these annotations to structure explanation dialogues
with users. The role of a premise in an argumentation scheme such as Toulmin’s,
however, is orthogonal to the premise types defined here. They serve different pur-
poses and can be used together.
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7.1 Logical AI Models of Defeasible Argumentation
The first logical models of argumentation in AI were proposed by Loui [23] and
Pollock [28], followed by, among others, Simari and Loui [39], Vreeswijk [45],
Pollock [29], Dung, [8], Bondarenko et al. [4] and much subsequent work. For an
overview, see Prakken & Vreeswijk [36]. As noted in the introduction, all this work
essentially takes a relational approach, ignoring or abstracting from the dialogical
context of argumentation and hardwiring proof burdens and proof standards into
the formalism. Below we briefly compare the ‘logical’ features of Carneades with
this work.
As for the structure of arguments, in AI two alternative approaches are taken, de-
pending on whether defeasibility arises from the use of a special kind of statement
or from the use of a special kind of inference rule. In the assumption-based ap-
proach [4], the information state is divided into a theory, containing certain state-
ments, and a set of default assumptions, comparable to negations of our exceptions.
Arguments are sets of assumptions that can be consistently added to the theory.
Conclusions can be drawn by applying some deductive consequence notion to the
combination of theory and argument. Arguments can be attacked by constructing
arguments that conclude the contrary of an assumption in the argument to be at-
tacked. In the inference-rule approach [45,29], the inference rules are divided into
strict and defeasible inference rules and arguments are conceived of as (possibly
composite) premise-conclusion structures instantiating some inference rule. Argu-
ments can be attacked on their defeasible inferences, for instance, with an argument
for a contradictory conclusion (Pollock’s rebuttals) or with an argument denying
that a defeasible inference rule applies in the case at hand (Pollock’s undercutters).
Carneades combines elements of both approaches. Its use of exceptions is similar to
the use of assumptions, while its idea that arguments instantiate argument schemes
allows for defeasible inference rules. Like Pollock and Vreeswijk, Carneades ab-
stracts from particular inference rules and the logical language. 12 Carneades shares
with Pollock [29] the feature that elementary arguments are combined in an argu-
ment graph. Pollock calls these inference graphs. In such a graph, each statement
occurs only once and arguments are recorded via links between the various state-
ments, passing through argument nodes. These nodes are similar to and links in
and/or graphs. While Pollock’s graphs contain special links between statements
for attack relations, in Carneades such attack relations are expressed either as a pair
of arguments pro and con the same statement or as an argument pro an exception.
A statement s and its complement s are not unrelated in Carneades. An argument
pro a s is equivalent to an argument con s. And the conclusion of an argument pro
s logically contradicts the conclusion of an argument con s. Also, Carneades dis-
12 Pollock and Vreeswijk, however, do rely on a negation operator to define argument con-
flict.
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tinguishes the types of premises in the graphs, to allocate the burden of proof for
statements among the parties.
As for argument attack, as explained above in Section 3, Pollock’s undercutters
can be represented using exceptions. Carneades’ distinction between pro and con
arguments is essentially the same as Pollock’s notion of rebutting arguments. Con
arguments should not be confused with Verheij’s [42] arguments with dialectical
negation. When in Verheij’s Deflog system arguments for a statement and its dialec-
tical negation can be constructed, the latter automatically prevails; in Carneades, by
contrast, arguments pro and con the same statement may need to be compared to
see which one has priority, depending on the applicable proof standard. Note finally
that in Carneades, unlike in systems like those of Pollock and Vreeswijk, argument
premises also can be attacked. The reason is that Carneades assumes a dialogical
context in which any premise can be questioned, while in ‘relational’ approaches
the premises are given and only default assumptions can be attacked.
We next briefly compare Carneades’ argument evaluation mechanism with this
prior AI work. Because of its embedding in a dialogical context and its variable
proof burdens and proof standards, such a comparison is not straightforward. Nev-
ertheless, it is worthwhile disregarding these additional features of Carneades and
consider its ‘logical’ or ‘relational’ core.
Firstly, Theorem 1 shows that Carneades adopts the ‘unique assignment’ instead of
the ‘multiple-status assignment’ approach [36]. If, for instance, a statement has one
defensible pro argument and one defensible con argument and neither argument
has priority, then Carneades does not induce multiple status assignments (one in
which the statement is acceptable and one in which it is not). Instead it assigns
‘acceptable’ to the statement if it satisfies its proof standard and it assigns ‘not
acceptable’ to it otherwise.
Secondly, Carneades’ relational core sometimes exhibits so-called ‘ambiguity-blocking’
behavior. Informally, a nonmonotonic logic is called ambiguity-blocking if, when
a conflict between two lines of reasoning with contradictory conclusions cannot be
resolved, both lines of reasoning are cut-off and neither of the conclusions can be
used for further reasoning. In such logics it may happen that other lines of reasoning
remain undefeated even though one of the cut-off lines of reasoning interferes with
it and is not weaker. Consider the Carneades argument graph shown in Figure 8.
Suppose that the proof standard for all statements has been set to BA, that t, s and
r are accepted and that neither of the two arguments pro and con q has priority.
Then q is not acceptable. However p is acceptable, since the argument con p is
not defensible. For the same reason, p would remain acceptable even if the con
argument had priority over the pro argument.
It has been argued that such an outcome is counterintuitive. For instance, Makinson










Fig. 8. Ambiguity Blocking Example
ambiguous, the argument con p, although not alive, is not fully dead either, so it
should retain its interfering force as a ‘zombie’ argument. Logics in which ‘zombie
paths’ retaining their interfering force are sometimes called ‘ambiguity propagat-
ing’.
Others, e.g. Horty [21] and Governatori et. al [18] have instead argued that am-
biguity propagating is counterintuitive. Carneades’ procedural perspective offers
another justification for this position. In full Carneades, not reduced to its rela-
tional core, the status of q is not ambiguous, because the proof standard assigned
to q clearly regulates the acceptability of q, also when no argument has priority.
By assigning the BA proof standard to q, a policy decision was made to assign the
burden of proof to the proponent of q. This burden of proof has not been met; thus
q is certainly unacceptable. The proponent of q has lost this part of the argument.
On this procedural account, there is nothing unintuitive about the argument con p
failing. Since its only premise unequivocally does not hold, one should not expect
it to be taken into consideration when evaluating the acceptability of p.
7.2 Other Dialogical Work on Argumentation
As stated in the introduction, Carneades is meant to be an evaluative component
of systems supporting persuasion dialogues. In such dialogues, two or more par-
ticipants try to resolve a difference of opinion by arguing about the tenability of a
claim, each trying to persuade the other participants to adopt its point of view. Di-
alogue systems for persuasion regulate what utterances the participants can make
and under which conditions they can make them, what the effects of their utter-
ances are on their propositional commitments, when a dialogue terminates and what
the outcome of a dialogue is. Dialogue systems for persuasion have been defined
mainly in the areas of argumentation theory, AI (& Law) and multi-agent systems.
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See Prakken [32] for a recent overview.
As for the outcome of dialogues, some dialogue systems only focus on whether a
dialogue participant has changed his internal, subjective beliefs in the course of a
dialogue, which may not be observable for other agents. Systems of this kind can
especially be found in research on multi-agent systems, e.g. [27]. Other systems
focus on inter-subjective consensus between the dialogue participants, by looking
at whether they have (publicly) committed themselves to or rejected certain state-
ments. Basically, consensus has been achieved at the end of a dialogue if both
parties are committed or not committed to the main claim. This was the original
approach in argumentation theory, e.g. in [46]. Finally, there are dialogue systems
that besides the participants’ publicly declared standpoints also take standards im-
posed from the outside into account, so that a statement can be declared acceptable
or not in a certain dialogue state even if no consensus has been reached. This is the
class of systems Carneades is meant to support.
In some AI work these standards come from a (nonmonotonic) logic, which is ap-
plied to the current explicit consensus in a dialogue state. This was the approach
taken in the Pleading Game ([14], using conditional entailment [12], and also by,
for instance, Loui [24], who used a variant of Simari & Loui’s system [39], and
Brewka [5], who used prioritized default logic. In Prakken [31] this idea is refined.
First, a purely dialogical notion of acceptability is defined, in terms of attacking
and surrendering reply relations between dialogue utterances: On the basis of these
relations it is defined whether the initial move of a dialogue is in or out. Then it
is proven for a class of inference-based argumentation systems satisfying grounded
semantics that the initial move is in if and only if the main claim is logically implied
by the current consensus, assuming the participants make logically optimal moves
in the dialogue. Carneades takes Prakken’s approach to the extreme by replacing
his use of a relational consequence notion with the purely procedural notions of
proof burdens and proof standards. Also, Carneades replaces Prakken’s reply re-
lations between dialogue utterances with its dialectical status of statements, thus
fully abstracting from the speech acts of dialogues.
7.3 Other Work on Modeling Burden of Proof
As noted in the introduction, Carneades’ modeling of proof standards is inspired by
Freeman & Farley’s DART system [10], an implemented model of dialectical ar-
gumentation based on a semi-formal specification. DART models various forms of
defeasible reasoning with rules, including standard logic principles such as modus
ponens and modus tollens but also nonstandard ones, such as for abductive and a
contrario reasoning. The status of arguments is defined in terms of an argument
game parameterized by a proof level for the main claim. DART does not allow for
different levels of proof for premises of the main claim or for shifts of the burden
28
of proof to the other party and it does not take the dialogical status of statements
into account. Also, the distinction between burden of production and burden of
persuasion is not explicitly addressed.
As discussed above in Section 2, Prakken [30] adapts Prakken & Sartor’s [34] ar-
gumentation system based on grounded semantics to let it allow for shifts of the
burden of proof. The modified system assumes as input not just an (ordered) set of
rules but also an allocation of proof burdens for literals to plaintiff and defendant.
The argument game is modified to allow the two players (plaintiff and defendant) to
have different dialectical roles (proponent or opponent) for different propositions.
Although Prakken [30] does not explicitly distinguish the burdens of production
and persuasion, Prakken & Sartor [35] argue that this work in fact models distri-
bution of the burden of persuasion. They also argue that different proof levels can
be modeled by adopting different definitions of the binary defeat relation between
arguments assumed by a Dung-style approach. Our account in Section 6 of how
proof burdens can be represented in Carneades was meant to respect Prakken &
Sartor’s observations while retaining the special features of Carneades.
Finally, Prakken et al. [33] modified a persuasion dialogue game [31] to allow for
debates on who has the burden of proof. Allocations of proof burdens are expressed
with a special speech act, which can be moved in reply to a challenge of a claim.
Allocations can also be challenged, which gives rise to metadialogues about who
has the burden of proof. The resulting dialogue system provides a possible dialogi-
cal context for Carneades: the burden allocations agreed on in a dialogue could be
translated into the assignment of premise types and proof standards.
8 Conclusion
Carneades is a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation
which applies proof standards to determine the acceptability of statements on an
issue-by-issue basis. The main original contribution of Carneades is its method for
allocating the burden of proof to the proponent or respondent, for each premise
separately, using premises type, proof standards and the dialectical status of state-
ments. Useful for modeling legal dialogues, the burden of production and burden
of persuasion can be handled separately, with a different responsible party and ap-
plicable proof standard for each [35]. Following [30], our approach allows the bur-
dens of proof to be distributed over the parties and the applicable proof standard
to be changed as the dialogue progresses from stage to stage. Finally, Carneades’
allows critical questions of argumentation schemes to be modeled with additional
premises, using assumptions and exceptions.
Carneades is a semantic model of argumentation, not a calculus. However, since
this semantic model is formulated in terms of computable functions, the lambda
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calculus may be used as a formal system. As a semantic model, the question of the
soundness or completeness of Carneades does not arise. Rather, the relevant ques-
tion concerns the validity of the semantic model. Are these semantics sufficient for
providing the kind of argumentation support required by our intended application
scenarios? This question cannot be answered by purely formal means, but rather
requires experiments with realistic test cases.
Functional programming languages can be used to easily implement the model in
software. Indeed, Carneades has been fully implemented in this way, using the
Scheme programming language [22]. The implementation computes the accept-
ability of statements, given an argument graph and context as inputs. It can also
generate argument diagrams. The diagrams in Section 6 of this article were gener-
ated by the program.
Further work is required on modeling legal proof standards, such as ‘preponderance
of the evidence’ and ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. Although our validation efforts
thus far have been mainly in the legal domain, Carneades is intended to be a general
model of argumentation, not restricted to some application domain. Outside the le-
gal context, we plan to evaluate the suitability of Carneades for practical reasoning
in deliberation dialogues. When completed, Carneades will support a range of ar-
gumentation use cases, including argument construction, reconstruction, evaluation
and visualization.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1 For every argument context C with proof standard SE, BA or DV and
every argument graph G: acceptable and holds are total functions.
Proof: The proof is with induction on the structure of argument graphs. Recall that
G is finite and acyclic and every statement occurs in it only once. We first consider
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the acceptability of any statement node swith no parents. A statement is acceptable
iff it satisfies its proof standard. Since G does not contain any argument pro s, with
all three proof standards s trivially is not acceptable. We next examine the holds
function for any premise p containing s. If p = s then if s is accepted, p clearly
holds, if s is rejected, p clearly does not hold, and if s is stated or questioned, p
does not hold since s is not acceptable. If p = •s then if s is stated or accepted, p
holds, if s is rejected, p does not hold and if s is questioned, p does not hold since
s is not acceptable. Finally, if p = ◦s then if s is accepted, p clearly does not hold,
if s is rejected, p clearly holds and if s is at stated or questioned, p holds since s is
not acceptable.
Consider next any statement node s in G that has a parent node. Again s is accept-
able iff it satisfies its proof standard. All three proof standards depend only on the
arguments pro or con s that are inG. These arguments can be unambiguously iden-
tified since by the induction hypothesis the theorem holds for all parent statements
of s and all premises using them. Then clearly with all three proof standards s is
unambiguously either acceptable or not acceptable. We finally examine the holds
function for any premise using s. Since this function depends only on the accept-
ability and dialectical status of s, clearly all premises using s unambiguously either
hold or do not hold. 2
Theorem 2 For every argument context C with proof standards BA or DV and ev-
ery argument graph G, no statement s exists such that s and s are both acceptable.
Proof: Suppose s is acceptable. Then if ps(s) = BA, there exists a defensible
argument A pro s such that for all defensible arguments B con s it holds that A >
B. If s satisfies BA then there exists a defensible argumentB con s such that for all
defensible arguments A pro s it holds that B > A. But then > is not a strict partial
order. If ps(s) = DV, then there exists a defensible argument pro s and there is no
defensible argument con s. The latter immediately implies that s does not satisfy
DV. 2
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